COMPARISON AND THEJUSTIFICATION OF CHOICE

RUTH CHANGt
Suppose two alternatives are incomparable. Does it follow that
there can be no justified choice between them? Conventional wisdom has it that the comparability of alternatives is necessary for the
possibility of justified choice. After all, if two items cannot be compared, what ground could there be for choosing one rather than the
other?'
The conventional wisdom is implicit in every account of practical
justification according to which the justification of a choice is given
by a comparative fact about the alternatives, usually that the chosen
alternative is at least as good as the others in the relevant respect. So,
for example, choosing to spend the evening preparing tomorrow's
lecture rather than watching reruns on television might be justified
on the ground that preparing the lecture is better with respect to
"prudence" or "worthwhileness." Whatever consideration is deemed
relevant to a choice, it standardly is thought that a comparative fact
about the merits of the alternatives with respect to that consideration
is what justifies choosing one over the others. If there is no such
comparative fact, it seems that there can be nothing one rationally
ought to choose. Thus the conventional wisdom: The incomparability of alternatives precludes the possibility ofjustified choice.
Although widely assumed, the conventional wisdom has gone
largely unexamined. Recent interest in incomparability, however, has
generated a challenge to it. Some philosophers have argued that
there are incomparable alternatives-and in some cases that the incomparability is widespread-while insisting that they are not thereby
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committed to the failure of practical reason where incomparability
holds. Practical reason, it is thought, has the resources to justify
choice in the face of incomparability, for noncomparative considerations can justify choice. If what justifies choice need not be a comparison, then, it seems, the comparability of the alternatives is not
necessary forjustified choice.
The challenge to the conventional wisdom takes one of two
forms. There are those who seem to admit that comparative facts
about the alternatives, if they exist, provide the justification of choice
in the first instance, but maintain that if comparative facts run out,
noncomparative considerations can step in to justify choice. Joseph
Raz, for example, thinks that "the will" can justify choice between incomparable alternatives; if they are incomparable, practical reason favors neither, and so one is justified in doing what one feels like.
James Griffin maintains that prudence, as well as legal or moral consensus, helps to "shape" and "extend" the norms that provide the
standards according to which we may justifiably choose between morally incomparable alternatives.3 Thus, although comparisons justify
choice in the first instance, where comparison fails, there are further
practical resources that can justify waiting in the wings.

Others reject the idea that comparative facts about the alternatives preemptively provide the justification of choice. Comparative
facts are either irrelevant to the justification of choice or positively
cannotjustify choice. Michael Stocker holds that the "concrete" merits of an alternative can justify choosing it over others, whether or not
the alternatives can be compared; one might be justified in choosing
to read An Instance of the Fingerpostinstead of LordJim for the particu-

lar historical erudition it displays and the particular, suspenseful

2

See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, IN-

coMPARABILrIY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 125 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinafter

("[Oince reason has failed to adjudicate between a range of
options, we normally choose one for no further reason, simply because we want to.").
Although doing what one feels like is not, according to Raz, a "reason," doing what
one feels like is "justified" in the sense we mean here, namely, sanctioned by practical
reason. See also infra notes 15, 35-36. It is worth noting that Raz thinks that reasons
run out-and thus that one is justified in choosing what one feels like-both in the
case of incomparable alternatives and in the case in which alternatives are equally
good.
INCOMMENSURABILrIY]

3 SeeJames Griffin, Incommensurability: What's the Problem?, in INCOMMENSURABILnIy, supra note 2, at 35, 50 ("[M]oral norms-that is, norms as far as purely moral con-

siderations take them-are often highly indeterminate and need social agreement behind them to give them shape.").
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pleasure it provides, even if the novels are incomparable. Charles
Taylor has suggested that "articulation" of goods and a keen sense of
both the "shape" of our lives and the way different goods fit within it
provide the grounds for choosing one thing over another, not comparisons of the alternatives.5 "Specificationists" like Elijah Millgram,
Henry Richardson, and David Wiggins maintain that the grounds for
choice are given by deliberative specifications of the values at stake,
either constrained by or constitutive of one's conception of what
really matters.6 Facts about how the alternatives compare are irrelevant because the justification of choice is given by the specification,
not by a comparison.
Elizabeth Anderson has urged that it is not a comparative fact
about the alternatives that justifies choosing one over another, but
norms of rationality that govern the attitudes it is appropriate to have
towards them. So, for instance, she thinks that the justification for
choosing to save the life of one's mother rather than to keep a friendship cannot be that saving the life of one's mother is better in some
respect; rather, if one is justified in choosing the former option, it is
because saving one's mother expresses an appropriate attitude of love
towards her. In some cases, Anderson argues, the justification of
choice cannot be a comparative fact about the alternatives, because a
comparison between certain goods-such as human life on the one
hand and money on the other-goes against the very nature of such
goods.7 Steven Lukes makes a similar point about certain choices be-

See generally Michael Stocker, Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and
Maximization, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supranote 2, at 196.
See Charles Taylor, Leading a Life in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 2, at 170,
182-83.
6 See

ELIJAH

MILLGRAM,

PRACTICAL

INDUCION 53-66 (1997); HENRY S.
RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 69-74 (1994); Eliah Millgram,

Incommensurability and PracticalReasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 2, at
151, 161 ("[T]he process of rendering ends commensurable is the process of acquiring one's conception of what matters."); David Wiggins, Deliberationand PracticalReason, 76 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y (n.s.) 29 (1976).
7 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 17-43 (1993);
Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 2, at 90, 101-04; see also Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
SlingingArrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and DemocraticPolitics,
For the parallel point about
90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2145-65 (1990).
"incommensurability," that is, precise cardinal incomparability, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 2, at 234; Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 795-812 (1994). For a discussion of the distinction between

1572

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 146:1569

tween alternatives bearing sacred values and those bearing secular
values. A monk's choice of celibacy is not justified by a comparative
fact about the alternatives open to him but is instead a sacrifice de8
manded of him by the sacred values involved.
According to these authors, since whatjustifies choice need not,
and in some cases cannot, be a comparison of the alternatives, the
comparability of alternatives is not necessary for justified choice.
Thus, it is thought, the conventional wisdom is mistaken.
In this Article, I argue that the incomparabilists cannot have it
both ways; they cannot both maintain that some alternatives are incomparable and insist that practical reason may nevertheless deliver a
justified choice among them. In particular, I defend a view of practical justification according to which a comparative fact about the alternatives determines which alternative one is justified in choosing. 9
Call this view comparativism. If a comparative fact determines justified
choice, the comparability of alternatives is necessary to the possibility
ofjustified choice. Thus, if comparativism is true, then so is the conventional wisdom.
We need to ask what it is for something to determine justified
choice. It seems plausible to suppose, as opponents of the conventional wisdom seem to, that what justifies choice is what determines that
choice as justified. In other words, the justification for choosing x
over y determines the choice of x over y as justified. This is such a
natural assumption that it is hard to see how it could be doubted.
Given this assumption, the question, 'WVhat determines justified
choice?" becomes the question, "What justifies choice?" Comparativism, on the natural assumption, is the view that a comparative fact
about the alternatives provides the justification of choice.
The version of comparativism that embraces the natural assumption is direct; the determination of a justified choice is given directly
by the justification of that choice. Defense of direct comparativism
succeeds if it can be shown that the justification of every choice is a
comparative fact about the alternatives. I attempt to locate the intuitive appeal of direct comparativism in Part II and examine how far di-

"incomparability" and "incommensurability," see Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supranote 2, at 1, 1-2.
8 See Steven Lukes, Comparing the Incomparable: Trade-offs and Sacrifices, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 2, at 184, 187-88.
9 The "determination" I have in mind here is metaphysical, not epistemic. Comparativism is not the view that in order to know which alternative one is justified in
choosing, one must make a comparison of the alternatives.
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rect comparativism will take us in Part III. As I will suggest, there are
some justifications of choice that neither are, nor seem to reduce to,
comparisons of the alternatives. But my aim is not to settle the difficult and controversial question of whether direct comparativism is
correct. Rather, I argue that even if direct comparativism fails, comparativism does not, for there is another, indirect, version of comparativism that can be defended. According to indirect comparativism,
the natural assumption is mistaken: What determines a choice asjustified is not the justification of choice but whatever provides the justifying force of that justification. And the justifying force of any consideration-comparative or not-is itself given by a comparative fact
about the alternatives. I explain the distinction between a justification and its justifying force and sketch a defense of indirect comparativism in Part IV. A possible objection is examined in Part V. If indirect comparativism is correct, the conventional wisdom is secured; the
comparability of alternatives is necessary to the possibility ofjustified
choice.
I. PRELIMINARIES: CHOICE SITUATIONS, CHOICE VALUES,
AND JUSTIFICATION
A possible general worry about comparativism, in either version,
should be put to rest at the outset. This is the thought that, far from
needing defense, comparativism is trivially true. It might be thought
that comparativism follows from the very nature of choice. After all,
choice is essentially for one alternative as opposed to another; if one
must choose a dessert, one does not strictly choose the lemon tart if
that is all there is on the menu. Choice of one option as opposed to
another suggests that the merits of the alternatives must be comparable, for how else can one choose this as opposed to that?
Although choice involves choosing one thing over something
else, it does not follow that choice, let alone justified choice, is determined by facts about how the alternatives compare. At best, choosing one thing over another requires merely that the alternatives be
recognized and duly considered. One might choose a life of quiet
contemplation, having considered what alternative lives would be like,
without that choice having been determined by the comparative facts
in the case: the quiet life appeals. If comparativism is to be won, it
cannot be won trivially by appeal to this conceptual feature of choice.
Perhaps comparativism is trivially true given the nature ofjustification. There is a trivial sense in which comparative facts about the alternatives determine which alternative one rationally ought to choose:
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Ajustified choice is, by definition, one that is "best justified," that is,
at least as good as the others with respect to 'Justifiability," or
"reason," or "choiceworthiness."' It is a conceptual platitude that a
justified choice is at least as good as the others with respect to justifiability." In this way, justified choice is determined trivially by a comparative fact about the alternatives; a choice cannot be justified if
there are better grounds for choosing something else.
But this is to misunderstand comparativism. Taking the platitude
for granted, there is the question of how "best justified" is to be understood. Telling someone to choose the alternative that is at least as
good as the others with respect to justifiability is not telling her much;
it is the further question about what that in turn entails that is of interest. And it is to this further question that comparativism purports
to provide an answer. As we have already seen, some think that a
"best justified" choice is one that is at least as good as the alternatives
with respect to values like prudence or worthwhileness, while others
think that such comparisons are no part of what makes something
"best justified." As a view about what it is to be best justified, comparativism cannot be defended by an appeal to the platitude that all
justified choices are bestjustified.
We now sketch the basic elements of any account of practical justification. Start with the idea of choice. All choices are made in the
context of a choice situation. Roughly, a choice situation is any actual
or possible situation in which an agent must choose only one of a
multiple, but finite, number of available alternatives. I shall take the
notion of a choice situation for granted and assume that we know one
when we see one. Therefore, I will not bother with pathological

'0 Although I will sometimes write in terms of "the justified choice" and "the best
justified," I do not mean to rule out the possibility that there is more than one (best)
justified choice. A case in which the alternatives are equally best in the relevant respects is an obvious case in which there are multiple justified choices. Moreover, the
expression "at least as good as" should not be understood as committing one to the
view that "better than," "worse than," and "equally good" exhaust the logical space of
comparability between items. See Chang, supra note 7, at 4-5.
" The platitude should be understood as compatible with one ground "silencing"
or "excluding" another. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, PRACrICAL REASON AND NORMs 35-48

(1990); John McDowell, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?, 52 ARISTOTELUAN SOC'Y 13, 28-29 (Supp. 1978).
1 An alternative is available to an agent if in some ordinary, nonmetaphysical
sense, she could have chosen it. Choice is always "free" in the correlative, ordinary
sense, even if it is made under duress or evaluatively overdetermined. If free choice in
the ordinary sense presupposes the compatibility of free will and determinism, then I
assume compatibilism.
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cases, such as ones in which there are an infinite number of alternatives, or in which the alternatives are essentially ill-defined.
A critical element of any choice situation is what we might call the
"choice value." A value is any substantive evaluative consideration
ranging from pleasure to choiceworthiness.'5 A choice value is,
roughly, what matters in the choice, given the specificfacts of the situation
in which it figures. Thus, general considerations of "the right," like
"justifiability" and "choiceworthiness," cannot be choice values. What
matters in a choice between two careers, for instance, may be achieving financial security or personal happiness, fulfilling duties to oneself or to one's family, or intrinsic worthwhileness. Without some
choice value, there can be no choice situation, for without there being something at stake, we have only a description of a state of affairs
not yet amounting to a situation that calls for choice.
Every choice is relative to a choice value; one can only choose
relative to something that matters. 14 This is a conceptual feature of
choice. Consider the difference between choice and what we might
call "selection." Selection of an item is a mere physical or mental
highlighting of the item-such as picking it up or forming a bare intention about it-without regard to the broader context of what matters to action. Choice, in contrast, is made in response to what matters in a given situation that calls for action. We can select items willynilly, but choice must be relative to something that matters. If I
choose x over y, there is something at stake to which my choice is responsive. Thus, I can choose x over y relative to some choice value,
but I cannot choose x over y simpliciter.
"' It is important to emphasize that my use of "value" is in one way broader, and in
another way narrower, than ordinary use of the term. On the ordinary understanding
of "value," duties, virtues, rules of conduct, and so on, are not properly"values." I use
"value" as a technical term to denote any substantive, nongerrymandered, evaluative
consideration with respect to which a meaningful comparison can be made. At the
same time, I wish to exclude references to what people want or prefer in the sense of
what they value, such as "she values money and fancy clothes." John Mackie seems to
have a similarly broad notion of value in mind. See J.L. MACKIE, ETHics 15 (1.977)
("The claim that values are not objective... is meant to include not only moral goodness .... but also other things that could be more loosely called moral values or disvalues-rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action's being rotten and contemptible, and so on."). For the sake of simplicity, all my examples will involve
"positive" values like "kindness" rather than "negative" values like "cruelty."
14 It rightly might be thought that there is, typically, if
not always, more than one

value that matters in a choice. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article, I
believe that these values are all contributory components of a single value, what I am
here calling "the choice value." The materials needed for the argument defending
this claim can be found in Chang, supranote 7, at 27-32.
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By "the justification of choice," I have in mind the "all-in," "normative," "undefeated," et cetera, ground of, that is, the warrant for,
choice.' 5 Thejustification serves as a recommendation for the chosen
option and is theoretically distinct from both an agent's motivation for
choosing and the ground on which she chooses as she does, though in
any given case their contents may coincide. The practical justification
with which I am concerned here is objective; it is the warrant for an
agent's choosing one alternative among a given set in a choice situation, whatever her epistemic state (at least where epistemic state is not
relevant to the warrant). Though I fashion my arguments for a thoroughgoing objectivist view, the arguments can, with little modification, be applied to justification relative to some epistemic or evaluative deficiency.
Every ground of choice has normative force. If there is a ground
for choosing x, then, barring any defeating grounds, one rationally
ought to choose it. A justifying ground is undefeated; it has the normative force required to satisfy the demand for justification. Something satisfies the demand for justification if it provides a satisfactory
answer to the normative question, "Why choose x?" For example, one
might ask in a given choice situation, "Why should I commute by
train rather than by bus?" A justification might be that the train is
faster. A justifying ground satisfies the demand for justificatory explanation.
Whether a ground satisfies the demand for justification is determined, in part, by the choice value of the choice situation. "Because I
am able to satisfy my thirst for death-defying thrills" justifies choosing
a career in competitive skydiving over one in accounting if what matters is satisfying that thirst, but it may not justify the choice if what
a ground is justifymatters is achieving financial security. Whether
6
is.
value
choice
the
what
on
depends
ing, then,
5 I avoid framing the discussion of practical justification in terms of "reasons"
since the term has philosophical baggage we here can do without. For example,
Joseph Raz thinks that a choice may be justified even though there is no "reason" for
choosing it-thus his claim that practical reason can sanction a choice even when reasons run out. I shall use the more neutral term "grounds" to cover all considerations
that couldjustify choice. "Reasons" in Raz's sense are a subset of "grounds."
16 There is, of course, a great deal more that needs to be said about what it is for
something to be ajustifying ground, but for our purposes, the gloss in terms of satisfying the demand for justification will do. I do not, for instance, attempt to answer the
difficult question: What determines the choice value? There often will be disagreement about what matters in the choice. So one member of a hiring committee may
see a choice situation as involving a choice value of "diversity" while another may see a
different choice situation altogether-one in which what matters is "quality of scholar-
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With the basic elements of an account of practical justification in
hand, we can now refine our general definition of comparativism.
Comparativism holds that it is the fact that x stands in such-and-such
relation to y with respect to choice value V that determines which alternative one rationally ought to choose.
Now it should not be thought that the relativity of choice to a
choice value itself entails comparativism; this relativity does not entail
that a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to the
choice value determines which alternative one is justified in choosing. A choice between lemon tart and grass pudding'7 might be relative to "gustatory pleasure," but it does not follow that it is the fact
that (let us assume) the lemon tart tastes better that determines that
one rationally ought to choose it. (This entailment does not hold
even though, as I have argued elsewhere, comparisons themselves
must be relative to a "covering value."' 8) Or, a choice between finishing an overdue article or going out to brunch with friends might be
relative to "fulfilling one's obligations," but what determines which
one rationally ought to choose may simply be the fact that one owes
the article to the long-suffering editor. Whether that fact reduces to,
or in some way depends on, a comparison of the alternatives with respect to "fulfilling one's obligations" is a further matter that cannot
be settled by mere appeal to the claim that choice is relative to a
value.
II. DIRECT COMPARATvIsM: OPTIMIZING
There is only one form of comparativism that exists in the literature. It is optimizing- Whatjustifies choosing one alternative over another is the fact that the chosen alternative is at least as good as the
others with respect to the choice value. Optimizing is a form of direct
comparativism; it assumes that the justification of choice determines
which choice is justified. In this Part, I try to locate optimizing's intuitive appeal.
Optimizing is explicit in instrumentalist approaches to rational
choice and decision theory, and implicit in most forms of consequentialism, some versions of virtue theory, and, arguably, certain forms of
ship." Whether a ground justifies choice depends on there being a settled choice
value.
1 An Asian delicacy thought to be conducive
to health but very bitter in taste.
'8 See Chang, supra note 7, at 5 ("Every comparison must proceed in terms of a
value.... Call such a consideration the covering value of that comparison.").
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deontology. Some of its appeal, I suspect, may be due to an easy conflation with the conceptual platitude that every justified choice must
be at least as good as the others with respect to justifiability, that is,
"best justified." But optimizing is not a conceptual platitude; it is a
substantive view about what it is for a choice to be best justified. It
holds that a choice is at least as good as the others with respect to justifiability if it is at least as good as the others with respect to what matters in the choice situation.
We should dismiss one (strangely enduring) criticism of optimizing at the outset. It is sometimes assumed that optimizing commits
one to the view that what matters in choice is quantity of value, and
specifically, the more, the better. Since optimizing represents a justified option as one that bears the greatest quantity of whatever value is
at stake, it must presuppose that what matters in choice is, strictly,
amount of V The charge has been leveled most vigorously against
maximization, which represents a justified choice as that which bears
the greatest number of units of the value at stake. Classical forms of
utilitarianism, for example, have been traditional targets of this attack. But the attack is misguided; optimizers, whether or not maximizers, need not hold that what justifies choice is the fact that the
chosen alternative bears or brings about the greatest quantity of some
value. Optimizers need only assume that the justification of choice
can be representedin terms of, not necessarily reduced to, quantities of
value. Indeed, standard ordinal comparisons in terms of "better
than," "worse than," and "equally good" guarantee such numerical
representability.
Optimizing is most plausible where the choice value is itself quantitative in nature. Choosing to save two lives instead of one is justified
on the ground that saving two is better than saving one with respect
to "saving the greatest number of lives." But it is rarely, if ever, the
case that all that matters to choice is quantity of some value. Even
where lives are at stake, it might be argued that the number of lives
saved is never all that matters; perhaps the "quality" of lives or one's
relation to them properly is part of what matters in such situationsperhaps one should choose to save the masterful violinist/future discoverer of the cure for cancer/one's husband instead of two thieving
street urchins.' 9 Our concern to fulfill our moral obligations or to
Cf John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count, 6 PHIL- & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977)
(arguing that if one is morally justified in choosing to save the greater number over
the lesser, it cannot be on the ground that the greater number involve a greater number).
'9
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have pleasurable lives is not simply a concern about how many obligations we fulfill or how much pleasure we experience; we want to fulfill
our important obligations and experience diverse or qualitatively special pleasures. So, although it is clear that optimizing is correct when
quantity of value is all that matters, it is not clear whether quantity is
ever all that matters. Examination of such cases, then, will not help
us to understand optimizing's intuitive appeal.
The intuitive appeal can be found, I believe, in the supposed
"competitive" character of choice situations. Some choice situations
are literally competitions. Take, for instance, a choice situation in
which one must choose the winner of a poetry contest, the victor of a
gymnastics meet, or the best law school graduate for a tenure-track
teaching job. It is in the nature of such situations that the justification for choice must be optimizing. What matters in a choice between two candidates for a law teaching job might, for instance, be
academic creativity. That A is academically creative, however, cannot
justify choosing her over B, since B's academic creativity may be more
impressive. If one is justified in choosing A, it must be because she is
at least as good as B with respect to academic creativity. In competitive choice situations, nothing will satisfy the demand for justification
except the fact that the chosen alternative is at least as good as the
others with respect to the choice value. 0
Optimizers urge that all choice situations, whether or not literally
competitions, are competitive in character. Every choice situation is a
pitting of alternatives against one another in a contest defined by the
choice value. So, for example, means-end reasoning involves choosing the means that beats out all others with respect to "achieving end
E," and reasoning about ends involves choosing a final end that beats
out its competitors with respect to considerations such as "importance," "intrinsic worthiness," or "expression of what one ultimately
cares about." In general, optimizers suppose, the justification of
choice is the comparative fact that the one alternative beats out the
others with respect to what matters in choice.
I suspect that whether one thinks that optimizing tells the whole
of the story about practical justification ultimately turns on how persuasive one finds the metaphor of competition in certain choice
situations. I think the metaphor does not sit easily with certain kinds

20 One should not be fooled into thinking that optimizing does not hold simply
because a comparative fact need not be cited as the justifying ground of choice. Conversational implicature is often at work.
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of choice situations and that, in those situations, the justification of
choice is not a comparative fact about the alternatives. I do not, however, want to try to defend that view here. In the next Part, I explore
possible alternatives to optimizing. Is the justification of choice always a comparative fact about the alternatives? On the face of things,
it seems that noncomparative considerations can operate as justifications of choice. Perhaps, as some have thought, in some choice situations, a consideration can justify choice only if it is noncomparative.
The critical issues for the direct comparativist, then, are whether putatively noncomparative justifications reduce to comparative ones,
and if they do not, whether they provide genuine justifications of
choice.
III.

DIRECT NONCOMPARATIVISM: ALTERNATIVES TO OPTIMIZING

Like comparativism, noncomparativism comes in direct and indirect versions. In its direct version, it claims that the justification of
choice can be an irreducibly noncomparative fact. Like its comparativist counterpart, direct noncomparativism accepts the natural assumption: Whatever justifies choice determines that choice as justified. Thus, it holds that a noncomparative fact may determine
justified choice.2'
All noncomparative considerations that could conceivably justify
choice can be classified into three broad types: satisficing, maximalizing, and absolutizing. Each of these types can be seen as responding to
a specific worry about optimizing.
First is the concern that optimizing is too demanding. Why
should rationality permit only what is comparatively best? Sometimes
it seems one is justified in choosing an alternative on the ground that
it is good enough, even though there may be something better in the
offing. Satisficing accounts of practical justification hold that the fact
that an alternative is good enough can justify choosing it. Second is
the worry that alternatives cannot always be compared. If alternatives
are incomparable with respect to the choice value, perhaps the fact
that an alternative is not worse than the others can be a justifying
ground. Maximalizing accounts hold that the fact that the chosen al-

For simplicity, I treat all possible justifications of choice as facts. Whether they
actually are facts is not relevant to our purposes.
2'
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ternative is not worse than the others can justify choosing it.2 Third,
and by far the most common, is the worry that the grounds for justified choice need not be comparative at all; in some situations, the justification of choice is not, and perhaps cannot be, a comparison of
the alternatives. It is instead an "absolute" consideration, one that by
its very nature is noncomparative. Absolutizing accounts hold that absolute considerations canjustify choice.23
Direct versions of noncomparativism-satisficing, maximalizing,
and absolutizing-claim that a choice can be justified on noncomparative grounds. Whether this claim succeeds for the satisficer or
the maximalizer depends on whether being "good enough" or being
"not worse" survives reductionist scrutiny.24 Against the absolutizer,
however, the reductionist attack fails by definition. Assuming that absolutizers have identified considerations that do not reduce to comparative facts about the alternatives, the question then is whether
such considerations canjustify choice.
A. Satisficing
Begin with satisficing, the view that being "good enough" can justify choosing one alternative over another. Michael Slote, for example, urges that the seller of a house may be justified in accepting an
offer within a satisfactory range even though she knows that a better
offer will be forthcoming.25 It is worth noting that it is hard to make
sense of satisficing in choice situations in which the given alternatives
are immediately available. If confronted with a choice between a
$159,000 offer and a $169,000 offer, it would be very bizarre indeed
to think that, ceterisparibus,choosing the former isjustified. The fact
that satisficing seems irrational when the better alternative is at hand
(or certain to be available in the future or available without transaction costs) suggests that something fishy is going on-perhaps some
nonzero probability that the better alternative will fail to materialize

borrow the term "maximalizing" from Amartya Sen. See AMARTYA K. SEN,
(1970) (explaining maximal elements
and choice sets).
23 The term "absolutizing" is an extension of Michael Stocker's. See Stocker, supra
2I
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note 4, at 196, 206.
24Whether they are adequate accounts of practical justification in other respects

is, of course, an open question. One obvious difficulty any alternative to optimizing
must face is a pragmatic challenge described in Chang, supranote 7, at 11.
2See MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING 17-18 (1989).
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or will involve some cost, or the fact that the higher price is unfair, is
surreptitiously being assumed.
Some satisficers, however, dig in their heels at this point. A seller
may be perfectly justified, they insist, in accepting the lower offer;
that $159,000 is good enough can be the justifying ground for accepting that offer. How can this be? Slote urges that "we find it humanly
understandable and not intuitively unreasonable that someone
should lack an interest in the greatest heights of well-being or happiness and should actually reject the latter in favor of moderate or suf6
So our seller may just be someone
ficient comfort or well-being.,
she would not deny that the
though
$159,000,
at
who sets her sights
extra $10,000 would increase her enjoyment of the choice value.
What accounts for the rationality of such a choice? Clearly, it is the
goodness of having moderate ends that accounts for the rationality of
satisficing so understoodY. Put differently, the choice value that governs the situation for the satisficer is different from the one that governs the one for the optimizer. For the optimizer, the choice value
might be "getting as much money as I can," and for the satisficer, it
might be "getting a reasonable amount."
If we understand satisficing in this way, it is natural to take as the
justifying ground a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to that moderate choice value. For example, if the offers I receive are $109,000, $159,000, and $169,000, and if $159,000 is a reasonable amount, then I may be justified in opting for $159,000
because $159,000 is at least as good as the alternatives with respect to
getting a reasonable amount. Perhaps $159,000 and $169,000 are
equally good with respect to getting a reasonable amount, that is, getting $159,000. Or perhaps $169,000 is worse since it overshoots getting a reasonable amount. In this case, the justifying ground is not
that the chosen alternative is good enough, but that it is as good as, or
better than, all its rivals with respect to what is good enough.
But satisficing need not be understood in this way. We can take
seriously the idea that the choice value is "getting as much money as I
can"; nevertheless, accepting $159,000 in the face of a higher offer is
justified because $159,000 is good enough with respect to getting as
much money as I can. In this case, we need to understand what it

26

Id. at 16.

2 If rationality is instrumental, there is no issue about the rationality of satisficing
since the moderate end is an end like any other.
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means for something to be "good enough with respect to the choice
value."
There are two possibilities. Either being good enough with respect to a choice value, V,involves comparison of the alternatives with
respect to V,or being good enough with respect to V is a noncomparative, "absolute" matter. Take the first possibility. "Good enough"
might be understood as "the mean of the alternatives" (or "the median of the alternatives," or "between the 85th and 90th percentile of
all possible bearers of V that could be alternatives for choice," and so
on). In this case, being good enough is a matter of comparisons of
the alternatives with respect to the choice value, ex hypothesi, "getting
as much money as I can." If I have offers of $109,000, $159,000, and
$169,000, I may be justified in opting for $159,000 because that is
good enough, where what is "good enough" is given by the median of
the available alternatives-in this case, $159,000. The justifying
ground is not the fact that $159,000 is at least as good as the alternatives with respect to "getting the median of the available alternatives"-that was the case we considered above when the moderate end
was itself the choice value-but rather a different consideration,
namely, that of the three alternatives, $159,000 is better than one and
worse than the other with respect to getting as much money as I can.
Note that we have comparativism, but in a somewhat surprising form:
The justification of choice is not the fact that the chosen item is at
least as good as the others, but rather that it is better than some and
worse than others. On this first possibility, then, the fact that something is good enough can provide a justifying ground only if being
good enough is understood in terms of certain comparative relations
that hold between the alternatives with respect to the choice value.
Although we do not have optimizing, the justification of choice is
nevertheless given by a comparative fact about the alternatives with
respect to the choice value.
The second possibility collapses satisficing into a form of absolutizing. What is good enough with respect to Vis given by some absolute, noncomparative standard. We discuss absolutizing accounts below. As we will see, some absolutizing accounts raise difficulties for
optimizing. However, no absolutizing account poses a genuine challenge to comparativism. Thus, although satisficing on at least one
construal presents an alternative to optimizing, it does not undermine the comparativist thesis.
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B. Maximalizing
Maximalizing considerations fare no better. According to maximalizing, I may be justified in choosing a legal career over a philosophical one when the choice value is, say, goodness as a career, on
the ground that the legal career is not a worse career than the philosophical one. Note that the fact that one thing is not worse than another is not a comparative fact, for it is compatible with their being
incomparable. That the chosen alternative is not worse than the others cannot justify the choice, however, for x may not be worse than y
with respect to V because x and y are incomparable with respect to V,
and the incomparability of x and y cannot provide a ground for
choosing x over y. This is not to beg the question by claiming that
choice between incomparables cannot be justified; the point is only
that the fact that they are incomparable cannot provide the justifying
ground. Given that being incomparable is not a justifying ground,
being "not worse than" cannot be one either. And if we exclude the
case in which the alternatives are incomparable from our understanding of "not worse than," then, assuming that the standard trichotomy
of relations, "better than," "worse than," and "equally good," exhausts
the space of comparability, maximalizing grounds reduce to optimizing ones. For "not worse than" will be equivalent to "at least as good
as."
There is something plausible about maximalizing, however. Conflict situations like the careers case above are common. It seems there
is no comparison of the alternatives with respect to the choice value.
And there is something intuitively rational about a policy that requires that we choose only what is not worse. But the rationality of a
maximalizing policy is one thing, and the existence of maximalizing
justifications of choice is another. We can understand maximalizing,
in other words, as a general pragmatic policy for yielding justified
choice in the face of uncertainty. Suppose, for example, that in our
careers case, no matter how carefully we deliberate, we cannot discover what comparison holds between the alternatives with respect to
"goodness as a career." It may be rational under these circumstances,
given the need to make a choice, to adopt a maximalizing policy.
Our choice situation is no longer one in which what matters is goodness as a career; the maximalizing policy suggests that, given our epistemic limitations, we understand ourselves as faced with a different
choice situation, one in which what matters is maximalizing goodness as
a career. If we cannot determine which career we ought to choose
when what matters is goodness as a career, then it may be rational to
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conceive of our plight instead as one in which what matters is choosing a career that is not worse than the others with respect to goodness
as a career. But notice that the justifying ground in such cases is
given by a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to
maximalizingsome value. Maximalizing grounds, then, either cannot
justify choice or, if they can, reduce to comparative facts about the alternatives with respect to the choice value or with respect to maximalizing the (original) choice value. In either case, they pose no challenge to comparativism.
C. Absolutizing

According to the largest and most interesting category of noncomparative alternatives to optimizing, "absolute" facts provide justifying grounds for choice. Absolute considerations that have been proposed as grounds justifying the choice of x over y include: the fact
that x is beautiful/kind/pleasurable/morally good, et cetera; the fact
that x-ing is my duty; the fact that the phronimos would choose x; the
fact that I feel like choosing x; the fact that choosing x expresses my
self ideal; and the fact that practical deliberation yields a conception
of the values at stake that supports choosing x. Let us grant that the
absolutizer's favored facts are absolute, that is, irreducibly noncomparative. Why should we think that absolute considerations can justify
choice?
Michael Stocker explains his version of absolutizing as follows:
[Absolutizers] can ... be understood as advocating concrete sorts of
lives, projects, courses of action, friendships, and so on. These are advocated because of what they concretely are-that is, the sorts of lives,
projects, and so on they are .... I choose [an alternative] because of
the concrete ways it is good: how it will fit into my life, what I will then
be able to do, and so on.

He asks us to consider the following case:
I am content because I have achieved a good life. I am offered an opportunity to make my life even better by changing jobs. I think that it
need not indicate any moral or rational failing to decline the offer....
What ... seems important... is that I have achieved a certain sort
of life-a good life-and that having achieved such a life.... Whatjustifies my doing what is nonmaximizing is how doing that fits into my

2'

Stocker, supra note 4, at 209-10.
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life-a life that is good enough, and that is good enough because of
to me.
what it is like, not because it is better than other lives open
This is an example in which "good enough" is understood in absolute terms; my life is "good enough" in that it bears a certain concrete goodness. That my current life bears this concrete goodness is a
ground that justifies my choosing my current life over one that I recognize is better. Now suppose that what matters in the choice between lives is "goodness as a life." (The notion of a life's being good,
not so good, or downright bad is familiar.) If the life that I could
have is better than my current life by being better in every aspect of
the choice value, then turning down the better life would be irrational.30 If, on the other hand, the offered life, though better, lacks
some of the valuable aspects of the choice value my current life bears,
then Stocker's case has some initial plausibility. Perhaps the merits
specific to my current life are sufficient grounds for sticking with it in
the face of an alternative that would, with respect to "goodness as a
life," be an improvement.
But how can the fact that one alternative bears certain aspects of
the choice value justify choosing it if the other alternative is better
with respect to the choice value, taking into account all of its aspects?
The initial plausibility of Stocker's case disappears once we realize
that a shift in choice value is required for the case to go through. For
the fact that my life bears certain concrete values can provide a
ground for rejecting another life that is better with respect to a value
that has those concrete values as aspects only if what matters to choice
is not the more comprehensive value but the concrete values that my
current life bears. The choice, however, then takes on an entirely different cast; we have a choice between two lives, the offered one of
which is worse with respect to "goodness as a life with concrete merits
a, b, c, ... " for the offered life lacks some of those concrete merits.31
Stocker's case has plausibility only if we do not make clear the choice

Id. at 207.
s0There is reason to doubt whether Pareto-betterness is necessarily a form of bet29

terness, however. The aspects of a choice value may be organically related such that
betterness with respect to one or even all aspects does not necessarily result in betterness with respect to the choice value itself. Goodness with respect to Vmay be a mean

of aspects of V, betterness with respect to an aspect may overshoot the mean of V,
thereby making the item worse with respect to V
s'Note that in the case in which the offered life contains all the concrete merits of
my current life and other merits as well, we have a choice between two lives, both of
which are equally good with respect to "goodness as a life with concrete merits
a, b, c .....
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value in the choice situation. Once the choice situation is wellformed, the attack on optimizing is not so persuasive.
Although Stocker's form of absolutizing may not be convincing, it
does not follow that no absolute consideration can serve as ajustification of choice. An intuitive distinction between two types of absolute
considerations, I believe, marks the division between those that can
justify choice and those that cannot. Some absolute considerations
are "merit-based," while others are "norm-based." Stocker's form of
absolutizing, according to which justifying grounds are provided by
the fact that the chosen alternative meets some concrete excellence,
appeals to a merit-based standard-the standard of "a good life." A
"norm-based standard," in contrast, is a rule about how one should
act, feel, intend, and so on. It is a standard to which human behavior
ought to aspire, not one according to which the merit of alternatives
is assessed. Deontologists, for example, hold that the noncomparative fact that x-ing is my duty provides ajustifying ground for choosing
x. That x-ing is my duty appeals to a norm-based standard, a rule
about how one should behave in certain circumstances, not essentially
a feature of the alternatives. 2
There is good reason to think that absolutizing is least plausible
when the absolute consideration appeals to a merit-based, as opposed
to a norm-based, standard. This is because the fact that the chosen
alternative meets some merit-based standard, whether intrinsic or instrumental, plausibly can satisfy the demand for justification only if it
is understood as elliptical for the claim that the chosen alternative
best satisfies the standard. As we saw above, appeal to the fact that
the chosen alternative meets a certain standard-in Stocker's case,
that of a particular, concrete goodness-cannot justify choice unless
the choice value is understood to be given by that standard. And in
this case, what justifies choice is not the fact that the chosen alternative meets the standard, but the fact that it meets the standard better
than any of the other alternatives.
Norm-based absolutizing grounds, in contrast, do seem to provide
justifying grounds for choice. Suppose that in Stocker's case, the putative justifying ground were something along the lines of "I have a
duty to my boss to stay in my presentjob." The offered ground would
then appeal to a norm-based standard-that this is what one does in
s2

See Anderson, supra note 7, at 108-09. Anderson's absolutizing account of prac-

tical action holds thatjustifying grounds are expressions of normative requirements of
rationality, and appeals essentially to norms governing appropriate attitudes towards
objects with intrinsic value.
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these circumstances. That it is one's duty does plausibly satisfy the
demand for justification. An appeal to a norm-based, noncomparafive feature of a chosen alternative satisfies the demand for justification when acting in conformity with norms is what matters in choice.
Yet the fact that it is my duty or that I am obligated to choose it is not
33
plausibly reduced to a comparative fact about the alternatives.
Norm-based considerations have to do with how we ought to behave,
not with how good alternatives are. Thus, it is plausible to think that
in some choice situations, there are justifying grounds of choice that
are not comparative facts about the alternatives.

As I have said, my aim is not to take a stand on the question of
whether any absolute consideration can justify choice. But even if direct comparativism fails, as I suspect it does in the face of norm-based
absolute considerations, we need not conclude that comparativism is
false. Direct comparativism is only one version of the comparativist
thesis. As we will see, even if some justifications are irreducibly noncomparative, justified choice is determined by a comparative fact
about the alternatives.
IV. INDIRECr COMPARATIVISM: COMPARISONS ANDJUSTIFYING FORCE
Ajustifying ground is one thing; its justifying force is another. A
ground's justifying force is that in virtue of which the ground justifies.
Indirect comparativism claims that it is not the justifying ground but
the justifying force of a justifying ground that determines justified
choice, and that the justifying force of any justifying ground is a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to the choice value.
In other words, a justification's justifying force-a comparative fact
about the alternatives with respect to the choice value-determines
justified choice. We should ask two questions. First, how is the justifying force of a justifying ground distinct from the justifying ground
itself? Second, why should we think that the fact about how the alternatives compare with respect to the choice value provides a
ground's justifying force?

" This is not to say that the fact that something fulfills a duty or obligation cannot
be described equivalently in terms of comparative facts about alternatives with respect
to "fulfilling my duty" and so on. The point is rather that the fact that it is my duty
does not simply amount to a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to
fulfilling my duty. Although it is true that choosing x, when choosing x fulfills my
duty, better fulfills my duty than choosing y, the fact that it is my duty is not the same as
the fact that choosing x better fulfills my duty.
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Turning to the first question, consider an analogy with inferences. Whatjustifies the inference q from the premises of p and ifp
then q? The premises support the conclusion, but that in virtue of
which they support it is the rule of inference, modus ponens. The rule
modus ponens is not any part of the support for the conclusion but is
instead that in virtue of which the premises support the conclusion; it
is what gives the premises the "logical power" to "bring about" the
conclusion. Or take the case of a window's breaking. What caused
the window to break was the impact of the brick. But the impact of
the brick is the cause in virtue of certain nomological laws that give
the impact the "causal power" to "bring about" the breaking of the
window. The nomological laws are not part of the cause; they are that
in virtue of which the cause has the power to cause. Or take the issue
of whether a desire is necessary to motivate action. Though it may be
true that a belief cannot motivate without the agent's having a disposition to develop certain desires in the face of the belief, one should
not think that the disposition, whether or not a desire, is itself part of
the motivation. The disposition is that in virtue of which the belief is
motivating, but it is not part of the motivation itself even though it is
what gives the belief the "motivational power" to "bring about" action.
Similarly, a ground may justify choice only in virtue of something
that is not part of the ground, but gives the ground its normative
force. The justifying force of a ground is that in virtue of which the
ground satisfies the demand forjustification. Consider the following
examples. I may be justified in choosing to go out to dinner rather
than to grade papers because I promised to show my friend a good
time. That I promised to show her a good time justifies my going out
to dinner-it silences the demand for justification when what matters
in the choice is fulfilling my promise to show her a good time. But
the fact that I promised to show her a good time can justify going out
to dinner only if it is true that going out to dinner is at least as good
with respect to fulfilling that promise as grading papers would be. Or
consider a choice to live near my parents in a boring suburb rather
than to move away to an exciting new city, assuming that what matters
in choice is satisfying my filial obligations. My choice is justified on
the ground that staying close to my parents is my filial duty. There is
no need to press for further grounds; that it is my filial duty satisfies
the demand for justification. At the same time, however, it satisfies
the demand only if it is true that staying close to home is at least as
good with respect to doing my filial duty as moving away. The claim
here is not that the fact that it is my duty to stay close to my parents
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reduces to or is elliptical for the comparative fact that staying close to
them is better with respect to doing my duty-we have already noted
that such suggestions misunderstand the nature of norm-based considerations. Rather, the claim is that the comparative fact, although
not part of the justifying ground, is necessary for there to be any justification whatsoever. Whatever justifies a choice can do so only in
virtue of a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to the
choice value. Though noncomparative considerations can satisfy the
demand for justification, they can do so only in virtue of a comparative fact about the alternatives.
To see that comparative facts provide grounds with their justifying
force, suppose the opposite. If certain absolute considerations justify
independently of comparative facts, we should be able to substitute an
unchosen alternative with a new alternative (or the new alternative
could simply be added to the original set) and, regardless of the merits of the new alternative, the original choice would still be justified.
But there is good reason to think this is false. An obligation to keep a
promise may justify my choosing to go out to dinner if the only other
option is to grade papers, but it fails to do so if rollerblading on the
beach is also on offer, for rollerblading on the beach better fulfills my
promise to show my friend a good time. Similarly, that I have an obligation to my parents justifies my choosing to live near them if the
only other option is to move far away, but not if the home office can
be converted into a spare bedroom. It is in virtue of the fact that the
chosen alternative is at least as good as the others with respect to
keeping one's promises or fulfilling one's duty, that the fact that I
promised to show her a good time or that it is my duty to stay near my
parents can justify choice. In general, it is only in virtue of a comparison of the alternatives with respect to what matters to choice that any
consideration can justify choice.
We can now see why it is the justifying force and not the justification that determines which alternative one rationally ought to choose.
That going out to dinner is what one rationally ought to choose is determined by the comparative fact that going out to dinner is at least as
good as the alternatives with respect to fulfilling my promise. Without that comparative fact, we have argued, the consideration that I
promised to show her a good time could not justify that choice. This
already goes some way toward showing that it is the justifying force
and not the justification that determines justified choice. For it
makes sense to think that whatever makes a consideration capable of
justifying choice is what determines a choice as justified. I suspect
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that it is this more refined thought that lies behind the naturalness of
the natural assumption. Once the distinction between justification
and justifying force is drawn, the mistake of the natural assumption is
apparent: What gives a consideration the power tojustify choice need
not be part of the consideration itself.
Moreover, a choice may be justified on many grounds. In the
present case, if what matters in the choice is keeping my promise, my
choosing to go out to dinner might by justified on the ground that I
promised to show my friend a good time, or that I have a duty to keep
my promise to show her a good time, or that going out to dinner better fulfills the promise than not, or that failing to go out to dinner
would involve breaking my promise to her, and so on. Each of these
justifications is different. It is hard to believe, however, that what determines that choosing to go to dinner is justified varies with each
possible justification. Surely what justifies a choice in a particular
choice situation relative to a particular choice value is a unitary consideration. Although the justification of a choice may vary, the justifying ground of any justification of that choice in that situation does
not. The justifying force of each justification in the present case is
the comparative fact that going out to dinner is at least as good as the
alternatives with respect to keeping my promise. It is this comparative
fact that determines the choice as justified.
The claim that the normativity of practical justification derives
from comparative facts about the alternatives vindicates comparativism, but only by severing the direct connection between justification
and the determination ofjustified choice. What silences the demand
for justification is not what determines a choice as justified; it is that
in virtue of which a consideration silences the demand that determines which alternative one rationally ought to choose. The comparability of alternatives with respect to the choice value is therefore
critical to the determination ofjustified choice. If alternatives are incomparable, there can be no justified choice. Thus, not only is comparativism vindicated, but so too is the conventional wisdom.
V. A CHALLENGE TO COMPARATIVISM: "FEELING LIKE IT"

There is one type of absolute consideration that poses a challenge
to indirect comparativism. This is the fact that one wills-feels likechoosing one thing rather than another. There are some choice
situations in which the fact that "I feel like it" seems to satisfy the demand for justification and seems to do so independently of any com-
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parative fact about the alternatives with respect to the choice value.
Comparativism needs to account for these cases.
Now it might be thought that this challenge can be quickly defused because the cases in which "feeling like it" seems to be ajustifying ground are ones in which, in fact, no ground is required and
none is offered. Perhaps there are some choices that are not properly
within the domain of practical reason. But it seems clear that there
are some cases in which there is an appropriate demand for justification and that demand is satisfied by the fact that one "feels like it."
To say you chose something because you felt like it is not to say that
you chose it on no ground; the ground you had was that you felt like
choosing it. Insofar as "feeling like it" can operate as a justifying
ground, we need to explain how, and whether, comparativism can accommodate it.
We need to distinguish two ways in which "feeling like it" might
be ajustifying ground.m Sometimes "feeling like it" is having a whim.
I may choose the lemon tart over the grass pudding simply because I
have a hankering for it. A whim is essentially tied to a belief that the
alternative or hankering for an alternative is enjoyable or pleasurable.
A whim for lemon tart, for example, may involve believing that the
taste of a cool, velvety custard juxtaposed with the sharp tang of
lemon is pleasurable.
When "feeling like it" indicates a whim, there is no challenge to
comparativism. For whims are a straightforward case of merit-based
absolute considerations that either are elliptical for the comparative
fact that the one alternative is at least as good as the others with respect to the pleasure or enjoyment that matters in the choice among
them, or cannot plausibly justify choice. Notice that a whim for something does not satisfy the demand for justification if the choice value
is not pleasure but is instead, say, healthfulness. That I have a whim
for lemon tart does not satisfy the demand for justification if what
matters is my cholesterol count (to which grass pudding does not
contribute). The justification, then, is not the whim but the fact that
the chosen alternative is at least as good as the others with respect to
what matters in the choice.
There is another, more interesting, case of "feeling like it," however. Sometimes, it seems, the justification for choosing the lemon
tart is the fact that I have a brute desire for it; I simply find myself want34 We grant, arguendo, that "feeling like it" is absolute, that is, not reducible
to a
comparative fact about the alternatives.
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ing it without believing that it would be pleasing or attractive in any
way. What matters in the choice might be gustatory pleasure, novelty,
or healthfulness, but, it seems, I may be justified in choosing the
lemon tart simply because I find myself seized with a desire for it,
even though, suppose, the grass pudding tastes better and is more
novel and healthful. If you say to me, "Look, you yourself admit that
what matters in the choice is healthfulness, and the grass pudding is
better with respect to healthfulness," I might reasonably rejoin, "But I
just feel like having lemon tart," where that is understood as reporting a brute disposition, a state of being seized by a desire or the like.
Isn't the demand for justification in such a choice situation thereby
satisfied?
Some philosophers have argued that brute desires can never be
grounds, let alone justifying grounds, of choice. For example,
Warren Quinn queries how we can "rationalize" the actions of someone who turns on radios whenever he sees one, not because he thinks
turning on radios is conducive to some end, but because he has the
brute desire to do so. s' If brute desires cannot make sense of actions,
they certainly cannot justify them. Quinn argues instead that if a desire is to ground choice, it must be elliptical for the fact that the de6
sired alternative is in some way good. In other words, "that I feel
like it" can justify choice only if it is understood as a whim or, more
generally, as elliptical for the fact that the desired alternative is at
least as good as the others in some evaluative respect. Brute desires,
however, are not elliptical for any such fact, and therefore cannot be

5 See WARREN QUINN, PuttingRationality in Its Place, in MoRALrIY AND AcnrON 228,
236-37 (1993). Joseph Raz points out that the agent himself will be unable to make
sense of a brute desire to paint potatoes green, "unless there is something in the action, his beliefs about it, or its circumstances and consequences which appears to him

to make the action sensible." Joseph Raz, On the Moral Point of View, in REASON,
ETHIcs, AND SOcIETY 58, 71-72 (J.B. Schneewind ed., 1997). Raz's view is similar to but
not the same as Quinn's, for unlike Quinn, who does not make a distinction between
justifying grounds that are reasons and those that are not, Raz claims only that desires
cannot be reasons. But since Raz recognizes that brute desires-the will-can justify
choice when reasons run out, he admits, unlike Quinn, that they can be justifying
grounds for choice.
m Indeed, the motivation for this understanding of brute desires derives from
general cognitivist commitments; Quinn thinks that all justifying grounds are evaluations of (or evaluative facts about) the alternatives. By understanding "feeling like it"
as elliptical for an evaluation, these grounds-cognitivists can offer a unified account of
justifying grounds. Raz's more sophisticated view involves the same cognitivist commitment towards reasonsbut allowsjustifying grounds to be noncognitive when reasons
run out.
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justifying grounds. The view that brute desires cannotjustify choice is
also held, with variations, by Derek Parfit and Thomas Scanlon.
Whether this view about brute desires is correct is part of a longstanding debate about reasons and motivation that traces back to
Hume and Kant. For the purpose of exploring a possible challenge
to comparativism, however, we can grant that brute desires can justify
choice. Our question is, in virtue of what do brute desires justify
choosing one thing over another? If their justifying force is provided
by an absolute consideration, then brute desires provide counterexamples to the comparativist thesis, for the determination of justified
choice in such cases is not given by a comparative fact about the alternatives. Thus we must ask, what provides the justifying force of a
brute desire?
We start with the observation that the only situations in which a
brute desire plausibly can provide a justifying ground are ones in
which it does not much matter which alternative one chooses. Suppose I must choose between turning in my brother, whom I suspect is
involved in criminal activity, and keeping silent with the knowledge
that his actions are harming innocent people. If I turn him in, he will
go to jail or worse. Could a brute desire-simply being seized with a
desire to turn him in-justify choosing to do so? Or suppose I must
choose between a career as an academic lawyer and one as an academic philosopher. Anyone with any knowledge of the two sorts of
careers will know that they are strikingly different. How could my
choice of one career be justified on the ground that I happened to
have a brute desire for it? Or consider the following modification of
our desserts case. I must choose between lemon tart and grass pudding, but what matters is not gustatory pleasure but my very survival;
one of the desserts is laced with lethal poison. In this case, a brute
desire for lemon tart would not be ajustifying ground; rather, considerations about which dessert is more conducive to my longevity would
provide the justification of choice. If a brute desire can be ajustifying
ground at all, it can be one only in cases of trivial importance. It is
the fact that the choice is of trivial importance that gives the brute desire its justifying force, assuming it has any. Comparativism need not,
at this point, collapse. For we must now ask whether this fact of trivi-

s7 See DEREK PARFIT, PRACTICAL REALISM (forthcoming); THOMAS
SCANLON, WHAT

WE OwE TO EACH OTHER (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 48-69, on file with
author).
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ality reduces to a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect
to the choice value.
There are two ways in which a choice can be of trivial importance,
that is, two ways in which it can fail to matter which alternative one
chooses. If there is very little difference in merit between the alternatives with respect to the choice value, then choice between them is, in
a comparativesense, trivial. So a choice between two careers, roughly
equally meritorious with respect to goodness as a career, is trivial in
this sense, with the limiting case being one of evaluative identity.
These cases pose no problem for comparativism, since the triviality of
the choice is given by a comparative fact about the alternatives with
respect to the choice value. Thus, the justifying force of "feeling like
it" is the comparative fact that the alternatives are pretty nearly
equally good. In many of these cases, brute desires will not provide
justifying grounds for choice.
But there is also an absolute, noncomparative sense of triviality.
Choices that have little importance for one's life or in the grand
scheme of things are trivial in the absolute sense. Typical choices between careers or lives or life-partners are not absolutely trivial, while
ones between desserts or fashion accessories or evening entertainments are. The absolute triviality of a choice is not a matter of comparative facts about the alternatives with respect to the choice value.
Raz thinks that brute desires can justify choice when alternatives
are incomparable. We have argued that a brute desire, if it can justify
choice, can do so only in virtue of the triviality of the choice. If this is
right, Raz's claim must be mistaken. For a choice between incomparables may be of very great significance. This is a point Raz himself
has made.-s If two very different careers are incomparable, it matters
a great deal which one chooses-the shape and quality of one's life
may hang on the choice. The incomparability of alternatives and the
triviality of choice cut across one another. Therefore, insofar as the
triviality of choice provides the justifying force of a brute desire, the
incomparability of alternatives cannot be that in virtue of which a
brute desire justifies. And yet Raz seems to suggest that it is in virtue
of the fact that the alternatives are incomparable (or more generally,
that reasons run out) that a brute desire can justify choice.
What can we conclude from our discussion of brute desires? Assuming that brute desires can be justifying grounds of choice, that in
virtue of which theyjusify can be an absolute consideration-namely,
SeeJOSEPHRAZ, THE MORALITY OFFREEDOM 332 (1986).
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the fact that the choice is of absolute trivial significance. So here we
have a type of case in which, ex hypothesi, neither the justifying ground
nor its justifying force is a comparative fact about the alternatives.
Does this show that comparativism is false, or at least not universal in
scope?
There are two considerations that limit the impact of these counterexamples for comparativism. One is that all of these counterexamples are, ex hypothesi, of absolute trivial significance. They cannot be generalized to nontrivial choice situations because a constraint
on such cases is that the choice involved be absolutely trivial. So the
problem they pose for comparativism, if they do pose a problem, is
restricted to cases of absolute unimportance. Perhaps we should not
shy away from comparativism on that account, especially if comparativism captures all other cases. The other consideration is that there
is as yet no convincing account of justifying grounds that unifies all
our intuitions about what can be a justifying ground. Some of the
leading grounds-cognitivists admit that brute desires pose a special
challenge to their case,3 9 and other theorists simply suppress the stubborn intuition. Perhaps the right conclusion to draw is not that comparativism is limited in scope, but that we operate with two subtly different notions ofjustifying grounds.
CONCLUSION

We started with the project of defending the conventional wisdom-the claim that the comparability of alternatives is necessary for
the possibility of justified choice. Our defense took the form of a
proposed account of practical justification, comparativism,which holds
that justified choice is determined by a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to the value at stake in the choice situation.
Many proponents of incomparability have argued that choice can
be justified on irreducibly noncomparative grounds and therefore
s9 See SCANLON, supranote 35 (manuscript at 57-58, on file with author). Scanlon
allows that there are cases in which the fact that one brutely desires something can be
grounds for action:
There is, certainly, a class of cases in which the fact that I "feel like" doing a

certain thing.., can provide me with a reason.... [I]t is possible that...
I simply let the matter be decided by what happens to appeal to me at the
time. I would not deny that there may be cases of this kind. If so, however,
they are special, rather trivial cases, not central examples of doing something... [on grounds] that provide the pattern on which all other cases
should be modelled.
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that the conventional wisdom is mistaken. So, for example, some
maintain that the fact that I have a duty to choose x over y, or that x is
good in a particular way, can justify choosing x over y even if x and y
are incomparable. Implicit in the incomparabilist challenge is what
we called the natural assumption, the assumption that the grounds
that justify choice not only justify choice but also determine that
choice as justified. If some justifications of choice are irreducibly
noncomparative considerations, such as the fact that I have a duty to
so choose, and if those noncomparative considerations in turn determine a choice as justified, comparativism and the conventional
wisdom must be mistaken.
We argued, however, that the natural assumption is false. What
justifies a choice may be different from what determines the choice as
justified. There is a distinction between what justifies a choice and
that in virtue of which itjustifies: Ajustification is one thing, its justifyingforce is another. It is ajustification's justifying force, not the justification itself, that determines which alternative one rationally ought
to choose. Indeed, we have suggested that what makes the natural assumption seem natural is the erroneous thought that the normativity
of a consideration must be part of the consideration itself.
If this is fight, the fact that some justifications of choice are irreducibly noncomparative does not defeat comparativism. For only
"direct" comparativism assumes that the justification of choice determines justified choice. "Indirect" comparativism recognizes that justification and the determination of justified choice may come apart.
We argued that the justifying force of any consideration is a comparative fact about the alternatives with respect to what matters in the
choice. Since it is ajustification's justifying force that determinesjustified choice, it follows that a comparative fact about the alternatives
determines justified choice. If there is no such comparative fact-if
the alternatives are incomparable-there can be no justified choice.
Thus, comparativism and the conventional wisdom are vindicated.
Let me end by highlighting two claims implied by the comparativist account of practical justification we have sketched here. First, if
comparative facts about the alternatives are that in virtue of which a
consideration can justify choice, then, assuming there are normative
facts, these comparative facts are very plausibly "basic" normative
facts, that is, normative facts that cannot be reduced to any other
normative fact. For whatever else might be true of basic normative
facts, it is plausible to suppose that they are that in virtue of which
considerations can have justifying force. Through our account of
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practical justification, then, we have secured a claim about what normative reality, if it exists, is like. Second, if, as we have argued, comparative facts about the alternatives determine justified choice, then a
question that has received too little attention in the literature becomes critical in the study of practical reason: Are alternatives for
choice always comparable? If alternatives are always comparable with
respect to what matters in the choice, then no matter how conflictridden or dilemmatic the situation, practical reason in principle determines a justified choice. Views claiming that grounds sometimes
run out or that choice itself is a contradictory, normless whirl, are
therefore wrongheaded.

